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dynamics of depoliticisation in PPPs, namely consultocracy, yield bias, and complex contracting, it contrib-
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has negative implications for democratic governance. The depoliticised logic behind PPPs feeds broad sen-
timents of political distrust and disappointment, because political decision makers tend to use PPPs as mir-
acle solutions for the delivery of public infrastructure without bearing the long-term budgetary conse-
quences of their own decisions. This constitutes an expectations gap: the difference between what is prom-
ised or expected by politicians on the one hand, and what they can actually deliver on the other. It is here 
that the short-term rationales and incentives of political decision makers collide with the wider public inter-
est in the longer term. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This article aims to explore what lessons can be learned from public-private partner-
ships (PPPs) in terms of depoliticisation and anti-politics. PPPs are long-term public in-
frastructure projects contracts which are mainly privately financed and operated. These 
partnerships combine the resources of government with those of private business actors 
in order to deliver societal goals or services, and share risks and costs related to that 
service delivery. To date, PPPs have been used to deliver more than 1600 major infra-
structure projects with a total value of over 700 billion US dollars (Public Works Financing 
2010). In the United Kingdom more than 700 PPP projects, with a total capital cost of 56 
billion British pounds, have reached financial close. Projects are found in a wide range of 
sectors including transport, schools, hospitals, prisons, housing, and defence (HM 
Treasury, 2014). 
This increasing use of PPPs has been crucial in shaping public infrastructure and ser-
vice delivery (Hodge & Greve 2017; Krumm 2016). While there has been much scholarly 
attention for PPPs from a variety of disciplines such as economics, law, management, 
and engineering, a limited number of studies have examined PPPs from a political per-
spective. This is a striking observation, since infrastructure policy and debates about 
PPPs are inherently political (Flinders 2005; Skelcher 2010). Roberts (2010) even calls 
PPPs one of the most powerful empirical illustrations of the pervasive force of the logic 
of discipline. This depoliticisation logic of PPPs can be explained by the analytical frame-
work of Wood and Flinders (2014). In PPPs tasks and responsibilities are transferred from 
the governmental sphere to the non-governmental sphere through their delegation to-
wards specialised private sector consortia. Consequently, the public nature of infrastruc-
ture and service delivery is no longer recognised, and a shift occurs towards rather indi-
vidualised responses to collective social challenges. The choice for PPPs is portrayed as 
the only sensible one, because supposedly there is no alternative (Willems & Van 
Dooren, 2016). 
This article has two objectives. First, we aim to refine the depoliticisation argument 
by using the case of PPP as an illustrative case. It is important to understand the diverse 
social mechanisms influencing the depoliticisation logic found in privately financed and 
operated public infrastructure projects. Hay (2014, pp.293–294) claims that empirical 
studies are particularly capable of bringing into the analysis of depoliticisation a series 
of new and important insights. That is what we intend to do with this study, as we focus 
on the specific case of PPPs, which constitutes an understudied case of complex and 
technical public decision making. We seek to answer the following question: how does 
depoliticisation manifest itself in the field of PPP? Second, this article aims to take a next 
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analytical step by explaining how depoliticisation may contribute to the growing anti-
politics trend. There seems to be an increasing gap between what is promised by or ex-
pected from political decision makers on the one hand, and what they can actually de-
liver on the other (Flinders 2012). We label this gap the expectations gap. PPPs arguably 
are helpful in delivering short-term gains to elected politicians who are eager to provide 
highly visible or high-profile infrastructure projects to their communities. However, 
while PPPs may be politically interesting for project delivery, their results in the long run, 
that is, in terms of value for taxpayers’ money, remain dubious. For instance, Boardman 
and Hellowell (2016, p.1) state that “governments are drawn to PPPs for many reasons, 
including their ability to address the so-called ‘infrastructure deficit’ without adding im-
mediately to official measures of public spending”. This growing expectations gap be-
tween elected politicians aiming for short-term project delivery success on the one hand, 
and voters wanting to secure a solid long-term deal for essential public goods and ser-
vices on the other, will likely trigger political distrust and disappointment (see Hodge 
2014). 
By combining the perspectives of depoliticisation and anti-politics, we seek to enrich 
our understanding of the PPP phenomenon. Vice versa, by using the empirical case of 
PPPs we will create new insights on the complex relationship between depoliticisation 
and anti-politics. As we disentangle the relationship between depoliticisation and anti-
politics in PPPs, we contribute to the debate on the state of our democracies, as well as 
the political science discipline (Wood 2015). The article is structured as follows. First, we 
briefly describe what is meant by PPPs and why they are a relevant study object. Second, 
we explain why PPPs are an important example of depoliticisation by identifying three 
social mechanisms that are at play: consultocracy, yield bias, and long-term and complex 
contracting. Third and finally, this article discusses the aforementioned expectations 
gap, showing how short-term rationales and incentives of political decision makers col-
lide with the general public interest in the long-term. 
 
 
2. Delineating Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
 
Before we proceed to linking PPP with depoliticisation and anti-politics, we aim to get a 
better understanding of the PPP phenomenon. We briefly discuss its definition and his-
torical background; its proliferation; and the underlying motivations for governments to 
embark on PPPs. 
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What are PPPs? 
 
Scholars have repeatedly tried to define the phenomenon of public-private partner-
ships, only to find out that its character is too ambiguous to capture in a single definition. 
Instead, they have come to agree that there is a need to acknowledge the diversity that 
is inherent to PPP. Several academic contributions elaborate on a classification of PPP in 
order to captivate that diversity and create an overview. Weihe (2008) comes up with a 
typology based on the differences between approaches toward urban regeneration, pol-
icy, infrastructure, and development. As such, PPP has become an umbrella term for a 
variety of partnership forms. Hodge and Greve (2010) distinguish five different families: 
(1) institutional cooperation for joint production and risk sharing, (2) long-term infra-
structure contracts that emphasise a tight specification of outputs in long-term legal 
contracts, (3) public policy networks in which loose stakeholder relationships are em-
phasised, (4) civil society and community development, and (5) urban renewal and 
downtown economic development. In this article, we focus on the second of five fami-
lies. This most visible form of PPP as long-term infrastructure contracts came into vogue 
in the 1990s, starting in the UK. The British model of PPP is officially called Private Fi-
nance Initiative (PFI). It was implemented under the Major administration in 1992 and 
became widely used under Blair’s New Labour administration from 1997 onwards. Since 
then it has spread to other Anglo-Saxon countries and Continental Europe, and it even-
tually became well-known worldwide (Krumm 2016). 
In typical long-term infrastructure contracts, a single private concessionaire is con-
tracted to design, build, finance, maintain, and sometimes operate (DBFM(O)) an infra-
structure asset on behalf of a government. The concessionaire holds a lease on the asset 
from the government for a period of several decades. After this period, the control over 
the facility goes back to the public sector. A PPP thus involves a one-covering contract 
that incorporates the lifecycle of an infrastructure asset and includes private financing. 
Additionally, in a PPP deal an amount of project risk is transferred from the public sector 
to the private sector, such as financial risk, construction risk, and the risk of subpar ser-
vice delivery. If the private concessionaire fails to meet a requirement set in the contrac-
tual agreement, it has to fix the problem at its own expense, and it may face financial 
penalties. The result of that would be that it would not recoup its initial investment in 
the project. Finally, the government will not pay for the asset until it is built, and after 
completion it will pay periodically recurring fees to the private sector partner throughout 
the lifecycle of the contract. These fees will reflect the degree of service delivery. 
Even though there are differences across PPP models, one common rationale ties the 
various forms and families together, namely that every PPP combines the resources of 
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governments and businesses with the intention to deliver societal goods or services, and 
they do so in a way that risks and costs are shared between the two sectors. As such, 
every PPP involves a “risk-sharing relationship based on a shared aspiration between the 
public sector and one or more partners from the private and/or voluntary sectors to 
deliver a publicly agreed outcome and/or public service” (Grimsey & Lewis 2007, p.xiv). 
In that sense, PPP is not nearly a new phenomenon. Public-private cooperation goes 
back centuries and has been used in a variety of sectors, including privateer shipping, 
treasury management, and railway exploitation (Wettenhall 2005). What makes current 
partnerships different from their historical predecessors, though, is that they have gone 
through many rebrands and revisions, or different waves as illustrated by Siemiatycki 
(2015) in Canada. As of today they are mostly seen as a form of project finance wherein 
the private sector handles the upfront costs for the provision of public infrastructures. 
 
 
Relevance of PPPs 
 
The proliferation of PPP is reflected in various figures. For instance, the journal Public 
Works Financing (2010) reports that between 1985 and 2010 governments set up more 
than 1600 major infrastructure projects using a public-private approach. These projects 
amounted to a combined value of over 700 billion US dollars. In 2014, European national 
governments closed PPP contracts at a total value of almost 19 billion euro (EPEC 2015). 
It is likely that the amount is even higher, as the European PPP Expertise Centre may be 
compromised due to a lack of data availability. As for the UK, a fairly exhaustive overview 
can be found online. The most recent database (dated March 2015) reported that con-
tracts had been signed for a total number of 724 PFI projects. The total capital value of 
these projects exceeded 57 billion British pounds. This figure thus excluded the amounts 
to be spent on projects that were in the procurement phase or in the pipeline (HM Treas-
ury & Infrastructure and Projects Authority 2016). In both the UK and other countries, 
partnership contracts have been closed in a wide range of sectors: road infrastructure, 
railways, healthcare, prisons, schools, sports facilities, and wastewater facilities, to men-
tion but a few examples. As of today, it is estimated that 10 to 20 percent of public in-
frastructure investments are done through public-private schemes. PPP is thus not the 
only game in town, but comprises a considerable part of public expenditures on infra-
structures and facilities. It is generally expected to become more important in the future 
due to tightening government budgets and the urgency of grand societal challenges and 
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the expensive solutions they require (e.g. climate action, energy transitions, and demo-
graphic change). Hence, governments do not seem to have much of a choice but to co-
operate with the private sector. 
The popularity of PPP has grown significantly over the past couple of decades, as has 
the popularity of collaborative arrangements in general. In these arrangements, public 
and private capabilities are brought together in order to find joint, negotiated solutions 
to societal challenges. Swyngedouw et al. (2003) even argue that the partnership model 
has become the preferred approach for government, leading to an upward shift in the 
private sector delivery of public infrastructure. PPPs thus have a clear relevance beyond 
the world of infrastructure projects and contracts. They have become exemplary of how 
governments and public agencies work nowadays: in collaboration with private sector 
actors, in a horizontal (network) structure, and with a high level of complexity. By focus-
ing on the specific example of PPPs it becomes possible to study the difficult notions of 
depoliticisation and anti-politics in a more hands-on manner, and thereby contribute to 
achieving a more fine-grained understanding of the state and challenges of democratic 
governance. 
 
 
Rationales Behind PPPs 
 
Governments have developed PPP policies for a variety of reasons. Furthermore, their 
motivations have evolved over time. Hodge and Greve (2013) list 18 of them. The initial 
reasons to start with PPP were mainly of a budgetary nature, that is, to circumvent re-
strictions on formal public sector debt levels. It was a way of providing infrastructure 
without increasing public sector borrowing (as recorded in the public accounts) or taxa-
tion levels. PPPs also promised to reduce the pressure on public sector budgets and pro-
vide more value for money (VfM) for taxpayers. An important rationale has been that 
the private sector is assumed to act more efficiently than the public sector. Private com-
panies with their own money at stake supposedly have a better track record of managing 
projects. They are expected to feel the pressure of creating a better product if they bear 
a larger risk share. It is assumed that by involving them in all stages of infrastructure 
provision, better value for taxpayers’ money can be achieved (Grimsey & Lewis 2004). 
Other arguments in support of PPP have included the transfer of risk from governments 
and citizens to the private sector, improved accountability for performance, better on-
time and on-budget infrastructure delivery, greater innovation, and long-term lifecycle 
benefits (Greve & Hodge 2013). 
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Although PPP is often portrayed as a new and neutral procurement method for deliv-
ering public services, it is a political tools par excellence (Hodge & Greve 2017; 
Siemiatycki 2015). The political choice for PPP delivery has social implications that touch 
upon the core functions of the state, e.g. public infrastructure and services like roads, 
schools, hospitals, social housing, prisons, and urban development projects. Some schol-
ars recognised the political consequences of PPP policy over a decade ago (Flinders 2005; 
Shaoul 2005), but they remain a weak voice in a field that has been dominated by a 
chorus of financial, legal, engineering, and managerial experts. Hodge et al. (2010) pay 
attention to the political nature of PPPs and express their concern that the transfer of 
public tasks and responsibilities to private actors may lead to a broken democratic chain 
of delegation (see also Skelcher 2010). PPPs are thus problematised for democratic rea-
sons. Some authors point explicitly to the principle of ministerial responsibility which is 
challenged by PPPs (Willems 2014). Because public tasks and responsibilities are shared 
with private sector partners, ministers who are in charge lose direct control and mem-
bers of parliament lose oversight and influence (Reeves 2013; Shaoul 2005; Siemiatycki 
2007). In addition to the problematic secrecy of PPP contracts, members of parliament, 
journalists, and citizens often lack the resources and expertise required to scrutinise 
properly these specialsed and technical legal documents. The complexity and technical-
ity of PPP projects and contracts withhold a broad political and public debate from taking 
place. Moreover, PPPs are problematised for bureaucratic reasons as they are portrayed 
as the only possible way to deliver large public infrastructure projects. It is argued that 
there is no alternative to making deals with the private sector if governments want to 
get things done (Flinders & Wood 2014, p.137). 
 
 
3. Depoliticisation in PPPs 
 
Depoliticisation includes the process of displacing decision making away from elected 
politicians as well as the increasing exercise of power by non-state actors. Flinders and 
Wood call it “the denial of political contingency and the transfer of functions away from 
elected politicians” (2014, p.135). We argue that the relatively young research field of 
PPPs can add new insights which contribute to a more sophisticated and comprehensive 
account of the concept of depoliticisation (see Wood & Flinders 2014 who advocate a 
cross-disciplinary approach). Depoliticisation has hitherto been studied mainly in regard 
to economic, monetary and fiscal policy (Burnham 2001; Jessop 2014); PPP remains a 
largely unexplored terrain. The relationship between depoliticisation and PPPs neither is 
entirely straightforward, nor clear-cut (Willems & Van Dooren 2016). 
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Although depoliticisation occurs in PPPs, elected politicians remain the key decision 
makers. Minister still take the decisions on whether to proceed with a specific long-term 
infrastructure project or not, and whether to choose the PPP route or not. Members of 
parliament are informed about these decisions, approve them through voting, and are 
able to hold ministers accountable. Therefore, Hay (2014, p.302) interprets depoliticisa-
tion as the process of erasing the politically contested character of governing. The prob-
lem is that it is not about less politics, nor about the end of politics, but about displaced 
and submerged politics – a politics which occurs elsewhere, typically on sites and in fo-
rums in which it is invisible to the wider public and unamenable to democratic scrutiny. 
According to Burnham (2001), the depoliticisation of decision making may even serve to 
enhance political control in certain ways. As Flinders comments, “depoliticisation, in all 
its forms, represents a dangerous illusion. It is the denial of politics while continuing pol-
itics by other means” (2012, p.93). Depoliticisation is therefore not absolute, but hap-
pens in a more subtle and implicit manner, as the empirical example of PPPs will illus-
trate. We explain this in detail by addressing three social mechanisms which reinforce 
each other and create a flywheel effect of stimulating depoliticisation and eventually a 
sense of political disengagement and distrust among communities. 
 
 
Consultocracy 
 
PPPs are apt examples of complex and technical public decision-making processes. 
They form a new frontier of depoliticisation which is partly driven by the rise of private 
legal advisors, financial consultants and technical engineers (Flyvbjerg et al. 2009, p.352 
on the role of these actors in megaprojects and; see also Vigoda-Gadot et al. 2014 on 
the privatisation of policy formulation). By granting these consultants access to public 
decision-making processes, the degree of democratic governance is affected. It could 
also increase the likelihood of planning fallacies, optimism bias, and strategic misrepre-
sentation, since the ones who calculate the risks bear little or no responsibility (Flyvbjerg 
2013; Lovallo & Kahneman 2003). Political analyses of the role and impact of these pri-
vate advisors have been surprisingly scarce (for some exceptions, see Beveridge 2012; 
Shaoul et al. 2007). Or, as Fischer (2009, p.17) puts it, “despite the central role of pro-
fessional expertise in the policy decision-making process, political scientists have tradi-
tionally considered this subject to fall outside their jurisdiction.” Nevertheless, the rise 
of consultants in the world of infrastructure projects, as well as their growing influence 
in this arena, is important to recognise and understand. 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 10(2) 2017: 448-471, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v10i2p471 
  
456 
 
Governments across the globe have been employing consultants to perform a great 
variety of roles and functions. Despite the recent global financial crisis, leading global 
accountancy companies and management and strategic consultancy firms have seen 
years of double-digit growth. This growth is largely due to major reforms that govern-
ments have had to make in recent years and that have led them to knock on the doors 
of consultants for help. As an example, the Obamacare health reform boosted 
healthcare consulting, and bank reforms in Western economies did the same for finan-
cial sector consultants (The Economist 2013). The activities and relevance of consultants 
have clearly increased. Furthermore, the role and influence of specialised legal advisory 
firms have also greatly expanded in light of the juridification of society (Van Waarden & 
Hildebrand 2009) and the rise of regulatory governance (Moran 2011). 
PPPs also illustrate the strong reliance and dependence of governments on consul-
tancy services (Boardman & Hellowell 2016; Shaoul et al. 2007). Especially in the policy 
preparation and decision-making phase of PPPs, we have seen that governments have 
increasingly turned to specialised consultancy and advisory firms who are then asked to 
help design and implement PPP policies and projects. Hodge and Bowman (2006) claim 
that a consultocracy has emerged which drives the global proliferation of the PPP busi-
ness. Crouch (2004) argues that there is an unchallengeable ideology on the belief that 
the expertise of business is superior to that of the government and its public officials. 
The high level of complexity in PPPs tends to feed this dependency on technical advisors. 
The large-scale DBFM Schools of Tomorrow program in Belgium (1.5 billion euros) illus-
trates this. The costs of consultancy services has risen to an unseen 3 million euro (VAT 
excluded), of which 2 million euro went to juridical advice and 1 million euro to financial 
and technical support (Flemish Parliament 2016). These modes of practice put at stake 
the amount of in-house expertise and experience in government agencies in the long 
run. 
There is also an important discursive dimension to the mechanism of consultocracy. 
The professional community of consultants, PPP units, lawyers and contractors has de-
veloped a distinct discourse, or even jargon, which is hard to understand for ministers 
and other political executives, members of parliament, interest groups, and journalists. 
PPP professionals talk of special purpose vehicles (SPVs) and DBFM(O) contracts, public 
sector comparators, risk allocations, and discount rates. This discourse makes it difficult 
for outsiders to oppose project governance; they may hardly understand the topic of 
concern. It bears comparison to contesting a taxi bill in a foreign city where you do not 
know the language, nor the norms nor the unwritten rules. The problem is aggravated 
by the positive, normative penchant of the PPP jargon. Public and private are said to be 
partners who are engaged in a competitive dialogue, focusing on risk sharing and using 
Tom Willems, Wouter Van Dooren, Martijn van den Hurk, PPP policy, depoliticisation, and anti-politics 
 
457 
 
private expertise. As such, the PPP language game is full of magic words that are hard to 
oppose (Hodge & Greve 2010). A quote from an interview with a minister in the Canadian 
province of Ontario (Siemiatycki 2015, p.350) illustrates the explicit rebranding tactics 
used regarding PPPs, which is to steer away from privatisation and towards alternative 
financing and value for money. The language does not leave room for alternative options 
when PPPs are depicted as the logical, rational thing to do (Willems & Van Dooren 2016). 
Who can be against dialogue and risk sharing between partners? This discursive aliena-
tion of policy makers from PPP project governance is a result of the emergent consultoc-
racy and a main driver of depoliticisation. 
 
 
Yield Bias 
 
The risk of depoliticisation is that monetary value takes precedence over public value. 
The growing importance of monetary interest has lured public value thinking further into 
the direction of a financial yield (Van den Hurk & Siemiatycki 2015). Proposed projects 
with high financial yields have a better chance of being selected. For instance, roads can 
be tolled and patients can be charged, but projects that deliver non-monetary value will 
likely have a hard time being selected. Building bike lanes and urban parks, dealing with 
pollution, and reinforcing embankments may add to livability, sustainability and security, 
but the merits of these measures are hard to monetise. By granting financial objectives 
and financial players a more important role in infrastructure delivery, governments have 
depoliticised processes that used to be anchored more firmly in democratic decision 
making. 
  The rise of private financiers in public infrastructure provision reinforces 
the yield bias. Private financing leads to a financialisation of the public sphere (Epstein 
2005; Pike & Pollard 2010). While public infrastructure provision has historically been a 
non-financial activity, governments have begun creating and monetizing infrastructure 
as an asset class. In doing so, they have expanded the market for private financiers and 
investors (Ashton et al. 2012, p.201). The considerations and preferences of banks, in-
vestors, and other players on the capital market have thus gained influence. Raco (2013) 
even argues that financial actors have actually taken over responsibilities that should 
have stayed within the public realm: “Fundamental political questions over the resourc-
ing of public sector infrastructure have become matters for financial experts and offi-
cials.” In their analysis of the various VfM appraisals used worldwide Boardman and Hel-
lowell (2016) also stress the dominance of the financial perspective of the Treasury: it is 
all about the financial consequences, and not the consequences for society at large. 
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  The yield bias can be further explained with an illustration on how design 
processes are structured in PPPs. Public controversies over large infrastructure projects 
are often sparked by visual renderings and replicas of what is planned. Designers, such 
as spatial planners and architects, play a key role in explaining, visually, the impact of 
projects. The additional costs of architectural quality can be discussed when designs are 
proposed. In traditional procurement, designers and architects have an autonomous role 
separated from the builders. They work for the public commissioner, not for any con-
struction company or financier. Public authorities use the designs to interact directly 
with citizens and end users during public consultation processes. New design ideas can 
then contribute to better tendering processes. 
  The organisational structure of a PPP does no longer allow for a direct 
line of communication between designers and end users, though. Designers are hired as 
subcontractors by private sector consortia. They thus work for the private concessionary 
instead of the government. The concessionary will likely assess the quality of the design-
ers’ work primarily on its financial merit. Private companies favor low costs, high profits, 
and low risk, and as a consequence it is not likely that innovative, high-risk proposals 
with non-financial benefits, such as visual quality, will be selected. The implication of this 
is that we can expect to see more mediocre designs coming out of PPP contracts. For 
instance, Siemiatycki (2014) articulates that out of a database of 3535 DBFM(O) PPPs, 
only 13 have won major architecture or design awards. In addition, some design award 
festivals make a categorized distinction between PPP projects and non-PPP projects, 
which is as such quite striking. Yet, the look and feel of projects is not a trivial matter. 
Design quality determines how citizens experience infrastructure. As power shifts from 
architects and designers to contractors and private financiers, the fire of depoliticisation 
is fueled, which may lead to a form of architecture that is increasingly distant from what 
communities want or need. 
 
 
Long-Term and Complex Contracting 
 
Roberts (2010) claims that depoliticisation often comes with the introduction of legal 
instruments (such as contracts) that accompany the shift of authority. Three contractual 
characteristics stand out here. First, PPPs usually include a long-term contract in which 
the government agrees to pay periodically for services provided by private actors, in the 
form of availability fees. This arrangement reduces the future budget autonomy of a 
government. When future policy makers intend to change public policy and adjust PPP 
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contracts, they can foresee costly renegotiations. In this case, depoliticisation limits fu-
ture policy and budget autonomy. Second, PPPs are regulated by complex, detailed, and 
inflexible contracts. Third and finally, the often claimed problematic secrecy of docu-
ments, which is due to clauses of commercial confidentiality, further complicates public 
questioning and debating – or even prevent these from taking place (Reeves 2013; 
Siemiatycki 2007). When it comes to PPPs, the primacy of politics is partly and indirectly 
shifted away from elected politicians, towards unelected and less accountable private 
actors. In this section, we briefly discuss each characteristic. 
First, a key feature of PPP contracts is that they cover the lifecycle of a project. The 
private concessionaire does not only build the infrastructure; it also takes responsibility 
for operations and maintenance for the duration of several decades. The rationale of 
lifecycle contracting is that the builder will be more attentive to quality when he is also 
in charge of operating and maintaining the infrastructure. Substandard work in the con-
struction phase will incur higher costs in the operational phase. Therefore, it is assumed 
that contractors will build sustainably and keep a keen eye on maintenance. However, a 
depoliticisation of future policy decisions is the other side of the coin here. As availability 
fees claim public budgets for the duration of the contract, PPP contracts cash in on future 
policy decisions; the hands of future politicians and policy makers are tied to contract 
specifications. PPPs have a similar effect on the budget as public debts: they need to be 
repaid, and hence limit future policy decisions. Krumm (2016) interestingly refers to the 
notion of privatised Keynesianism to explain PPP politics, a notion originally coined by 
Crouch (2009). Yet, in PPPs this demand-driven economic policy happens in a particularly 
hidden way, because the investments, as well as the future liabilities in terms of repay-
ment, are not necessarily visible in the public accounts (Greve & Hodge 2013; Shaoul 
2005). Moreover, in lifecycle contracts the constraints are stricter because output spec-
ifications regarding operations and maintenance are set more firmly than in conven-
tional contracts. Should policy makers want to adjust a gold-plated maintenance scheme 
of a highway, they are bound to face tough renegotiations. The concessionaire thus holds 
a strong, even monopolistic position once the contract has been signed. 
Second, public and private parties are trying to deal with uncertainty by negotiating 
solid contracts (Van den Hurk 2016). PPP contracts typically are thick bundles of paper, 
with hundreds, if not thousands of pages with densely packed legalese. The formula 
“risks times outputs” helps us understand this inflation of contracts. A key ingredient of 
a PPP is risk transfer. In order to transfer risk, one needs to identify what the risks are. 
Ke et al. (2010) identify numerous categories of risk, for instance the instability of gov-
ernment, insolvency of subcontractors, unproven engineering techniques, maintenance 
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costs, market demand, inflation risk, and force majeure risk. For every risk category, law-
yers make concrete descriptions of what a risk specifically comprehends. A second key 
ingredient of PPP is output specification. Rather than detailing how the work needs to 
be done, the public party needs to specify the outputs, for instance the availability of the 
infrastructure, noise levels, and the frequency of service. Output specifications are very 
detailed as well. PPP contracts specify what the consequence of each risk would be for 
the output specifications; hence the formula ”risks times outputs”. At the end of the day, 
the contractual complexity overwhelms public officials who supposedly represent the 
public interest (Raco 2013), but in fact delegate a significant amount of work to consult-
ants; contractual negotiations are not done by public officials and the private companies 
themselves, but by their respective lawyers. 
Third, public and political involvement in the PPP planning processes is an essential 
safeguard for democratic decision making (Siemiatycki 2007). Transparency is an im-
portant means of enforcing accountability and enabling critical political debate on both 
the substance and the governance of PPP projects. For Flyvbjerg et al. (2003), transpar-
ency is the primary means of enforcing accountability: 
 
The role of government is, in principle, to represent and protect the public interest (as 
defined by Parliament or legal precedent) and therefore it must at all times be possible for 
the public to verify whether this is indeed the case. The transparency requirement means, 
inter alia, that . . . all documents prepared or commissioned by the government should be 
released to groups and to the general public as they are produced. (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003, 
p.111) 
 
While the transparency predicament may be obvious to political science scholars, var-
ious pragmatic arguments against transparency have been made by the community of 
PPP professionals (Siemiatycki 2007). The first argument concerns commercial confiden-
tiality. In the bidding process, commercially sensitive bidder information on innovative 
techniques, corporate strategies, or delivery mechanisms cannot be released. As a re-
sult, the details and evaluation reports of the bids are typically kept confidential. These 
reports often hold politically relevant information on the merits of different project pro-
posals, but this information is kept out of the public debate. A second reason for confi-
dentiality concerns the bargaining position of the government. Private companies may 
adapt negotiation tactics to the funds that are available and the changes that are envis-
aged in the project scope. The extent to which the government is willing to compromise, 
for instance on the frequency of a service or the cleanliness of trains, is information of 
tactical or strategic importance in a negotiation. Yet, this information is also politically 
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relevant and withholding this information may contribute to depoliticisation. While con-
fidentiality clauses should be used sparingly (and not automatically) for the benefit of 
democratic accountability, the practice of PPP contracting shows that both public and 
private players often use extensive confidentiality arrangements (Reeves 2013; 
Siemiatycki 2007; Willems 2014). A shield of confidentiality is established during the bid-
ding process and retained after contract signing. Consequently, public scrutiny ex post 
hence also becomes more difficult and problematic. 
It is generally expected that depoliticisation in PPPs will continue to evolve. There is a 
tendency to reinforce the arguably technocratic features of PPP projects, which in turn 
strengthens the position of and increases the dependency on specialised private actors. 
This further induces depoliticisation in such a way that we observe a sort of flywheel 
effect. Consequently, depoliticisation tends to become a self-fulfilling prophecy, spread-
ing the ideologically non-neutral PPP business worldwide in favour of specialised private 
firms (see also Boardman & Hellowell 2016, p.2). 
 
 
4. Anti-Politics and PPPs 
 
We have hitherto argued that a number of social mechanisms are active in PPPs that 
feed depoliticisation, thereby disturbing the delicate balance between depoliticisation 
and politicisation (Willems & Van Dooren 2016). Furthermore, we hypothesise that these 
social mechanisms will gain power and speed, with significant implications for demo-
cratic governance. As an example, Skelcher (2010, p.299) states that “PPPs raise im-
portant issues of democratic governance due to the changed nature of the state when it 
engages in cooperative activities with private actors.” He warns for a democratic deficit 
due to a shortfall in accountability arrangements. Flinders (2010, p. 120-121) points to 
“the existence of a splintered logic in the sense that the values and principles on which 
PPPs are based and promoted are at odds with those traditionally found within the po-
litical and public sphere.” The underlying depoliticised logic in complex and technical 
policy processes like PPPs may contribute to a growing trend of anti-politics, which in-
cludes an increasing sense of distrust and disappointment toward political decision mak-
ers and politics at large. We observe an increasing expectations gap between what is 
promised or expected and what can actually be delivered by politicians (Flinders 2012). 
The case of PPPs provides an illustration of this gap, as we will explain in the remainder 
of this article. 
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Mega Credit Card: Buy Now, Pay Later 
 
PPPs have a political logic. They have not only grown popular due to their promise on 
delivering value for money. PPP is actually also a very useful and successful political tool. 
Hodge and Greve (2017, p.15) suggest that the “robust political success of the P3 phe-
nomenon along with continued proclamations of success by advocating governments 
seem to contrast the mixed empirical performance results.” The political performance – 
delivering new infrastructure without increasing the public sector borrowing ratio – 
seems to trump the ambiguous project performance of PPPs. While PPPs help deliver 
various short-term objectives of politicians, including ribbon cutting, they also very much 
push the cost burden to future governments. After all, the payment mechanism only 
starts working upon project completion. The real political incentive or driver is to deliver 
new and attractive infrastructure projects through private financing before the break of 
election time. What happens later, when the final invoice is delivered to the mailbox, is 
a matter of concern for the politicians (and citizens) of generations to come. For in-
stance, if something goes wrong with the price tag and outcomes of PPP projects, the 
responsible minister will likely be long gone. This perversity behind so-called neutral in-
struments like PPPs feeds sentiments of political anger and disappointment. The tension 
between short-term gains and long-term pains is obviously not limited or exclusive to 
PPPs, but in PPPs these tension become particularly relevant and visible over time. 
The debate between politicians and parties on taxes and expenditures is the core of 
politics. Although in most European countries the policy choice for PPPs is motivated 
mainly by value for money concerns, in some of them the ambition to keep public infra-
structure projects off the public balance sheet still plays an important role. In a recent 
presentation for the Flemish Parliament, the statistical office of the European Commis-
sion, Eurostat, gave an interesting overview of PPP practices in the European Union re-
garding the off-balance-sheet treatment of projects (Barredo Capelot & Prado Urena, 
2016). In the largest EU countries (France, Italy, Germany, Poland and Spain) all or most 
(over 80 percent) PPPs appear on the government balance sheet. A more heterogeneous 
picture is only found in the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Belgium, which have some 
projects on their balance sheet and others off the balance sheet. Eurostat calls Belgium 
a unique case in the EU, because the statistical treatment plays such a key role in the 
decision to procure PPPs or not. In fact, in Belgium some contracts have even been 
amended as many times as needed until the respective projects could be considered to 
be off the balance sheet. It is exactly this strong rationale to keep public investments 
outside the books that may become problematic in terms of depoliticisation and anti-
politics – especially in cash-strapped countries with huge public debts like Belgium. In 
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this regard, Hodge and Greve (2007) compare PPP contracting with a mega credit card 
for governments. The public debt and deficit remain stable because private sector actors 
(pre)finance the projects. It is only gradually, after the ribbons cutting, that the install-
ments appear in the public budget. And similarly to indebted consumers who lose sight 
of the debits on their stack of credit cards, governments accumulate stealth debts that 
do not appear in the official books. PPP contracting is of course not the only source of 
excess money. The accumulation of traditional public debt has the same potential for 
depoliticization and anti-politics, but has the advantage of being more transparent and 
accountable. 
 
 
Politics of Value for Money 
 
Bearing in mind the PPP credit card, political and public debates on which major pro-
jects are needed and how they perform seem no longer a priority. In addition, evaluating 
PPP performance is a difficult and political act given the different objectives, discourses, 
and disciplines involved (Siemiatycki 2015). Hodge and Greve (2013) list 18 possible goals 
or rationales. Depending on the perspective or criteria used in the assessment, a suc-
cessful project for one person or organisation is a failure for the other. Furthermore, 
some motivations for PPP have been more sincere than others. Although off-balance-
sheet treatment is still the major driving force behind PPPs in some countries, the eva-
sive notion of value for money has become the main rationale over time. Although eval-
uating value for money seems an easy and straightforward task, in reality it is a rather 
complex and nuanced exercise. International research on PPP performance shows that 
PPPs do not nearly always meet the proclaimed expectations (for instance on-time and 
on-budget delivery, and value for money) (Hodge & Greve 2007; Reeves 2013; 2015). 
The global financial crisis has further affected the value for money that PPP contracting 
can deliver, mainly because it has made private financing more expensive (Greve & 
Hodge 2013). 
Siemiatycki and Farooqi (2012) point to the importance of the politics at play behind 
VfM. Although the selection of a PPP and risk allocation strategy is based on a technical 
evaluation of a project’s merits, the sophisticated nature of VfM assessment cannot hide 
the inherently political character of a decision. Also, Boardman and Hellowell (2016) 
underline the importance of the chosen discount rate and methodology to determine 
whether PPPs lead to more value for money. Adjusting a few technical assumptions or 
parameters in the VfM assesment can already lead to totally different results and open 
the door to potential political influencing. Empirical research shows that PPP is a rather 
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expensive way of delivering infrastructure (Boardman & Hellowell 2016; Siemiatycki & 
Farooqi 2012). Consequently, PPP contracting provides decision makers with excess 
money for deals that may be politically appealing, but often lack a solid business case or 
come with a high price (Boardman & Vining 2012). The involvement of private corpora-
tions does not necessarily bring along better due diligence. Strikingly, private companies 
often have nothing to lose in PPPs, because many risks of project failure ultimately re-
main in the hands of the public sector. In Belgium, the privately financed and operated 
Liefkenshoek Tunnel project, a toll road tunnel in the port of Antwerp, went bankrupt in 
the early 1990s, forcing the Flemish government to step in and take over the debts. Like-
wise, the taxpayer bailout of the bankrupted Metronet, one of the two firms charged 
with upgrading the London Underground network following a multi-billion-British pound 
PPP deal, is a renowned case in which the government had to get financially involved 
given the necessity of the Underground for the city (The Economist 2007). 
The UK Treasury Select Committee concluded in 2011 that PFI does not provide tax-
payers value for money (HM Treasury Select Committee 2011). In addition, the UK Public 
Accounts Committee has stated that returns to investors have been too high and have 
led to high excess costs for public authorities. Furthermore, they found no convincing 
evidence of better value for money in PFI projects. PPPs often led to windfall profits for 
private executives, while public benefits are left unclear and languishing in the long term 
(Hellowell & Vecchi 2013). In sum, while major amounts of public funding continue to be 
invested in public-private endeavors, there continues to be a lively scholarly debate on 
whether PPPs actually deliver value for money (Siemiatycki & Farooqi 2012); whether 
they do lead to a better care of public assets and services (Raco 2013); whether govern-
ments have been able to make good deals with the private sector in terms of the price 
they pay and the quality they receive (Vecchi et al. 2013); and whether they are demo-
cratically legitimate at all (Shaoul 2005). 
 
 
It’s the Expectations Gap, Stupid! 
 
Putting the aforementioned criticism of off-balance-sheet financing and dubious value 
for money aside, PPPs do help governments in putting costly infrastructure funding on 
the public agenda and get projects implemented on time and on budget. In other words, 
they help political decision makers to get things done in times of budgetary and financial 
difficulties and raising expectations of the public. Nevertheless, while PPPs are politically 
performing in terms of making projects possible, their project performance in the long 
run, that is, in terms of value for money for taxpayers, is ambiguous, to say the least 
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(Hodge & Greve 2017; see also Boardman et al. 2015). This growing expectations gap 
between elected politicians aiming for short-term project delivery success on the one 
hand, and the public wanting to secure a fair and good deal in the long run for essential 
public goods and services on the other, may trigger feelings of political distrust and frus-
tration. While politicians promise to deliver a lot of new and state-of-the-art public in-
frastructure projects, they refuse to tell the whole truth about how to pay for them, nor 
do they explain in detail the increased role and impact of private sector consortia in de-
livering them. As indicated by the former Flemish Government’s Architect, Peter Swin-
nen, in his policy note: 
 
The construction of public infrastructure and community facilities by private institutions 
is not just an innocent trend. The most interesting private partner from a commercial point 
of view has a large say in the future of our cities, our infrastructure, our homes, our 
healthcare, and so on. This does not have to lead to failure, provided that the public and 
private actors strive for the realisation of a common project and thereby premise the same 
societal values. [However,] in reality this happens seldom or not at all. What is an urgent 
need for one actor, is just a commercial opportunity for the other. (Swinnen 2010) 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Depoliticised PPPs put great demands on future public decision making. The recogni-
tion of the political nature of PPPs is an illustration of a larger agenda of re-politicising 
public decision making. Certain policy choices are too easily accepted, and some policy 
debates are too easily silenced by claiming incorrectly that they are either unavoidable 
or logical according to econometric models (Jessop 2014, p.216). PPP contracting holds 
the risk of muted political controversy over infrastructure projects, yet it is exactly these 
controversies that are needed for a genuine political debate. Depoliticisation reduces 
the autonomy for both present-day and future politicians and suggests that there is no 
alternative to financing and operating the proposed public infrastructure than through 
private sector consortia or special purpose vehicles. PPPs thus constitute an important 
empirical micro-case of depoliticisation. 
In this article, we have disentangled the complex relationship between depoliticisa-
tion and anti-politics in PPPs. By identifying three social mechanisms that underlie depo-
liticisation in PPPs (the consultocracy in the PPP business, a strong yield bias in projects 
driven by financial rationales and specialists, and complex contracting), the article con-
tributes to the growing interdisciplinary literature on depoliticisation. We argue that 
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there are good reasons to assume that depoliticisation is most likely to continue to pro-
liferate further and eventually lead to an unhealthy unbalance between depoliticisation 
and politicisation, with negative implications for democratic governance. It is likely that 
the depoliticised logic behind PPPs will eventually feed sentiments of political alienation 
and frustration, because politicians tend to use PPPs as a miracle solution to public in-
frastructure challenges without bearing the major budgetary consequences of their own 
decisions. After all, the repercussions of their own work are shifted to future generations 
of taxpayers. PPPs are thus a prime example of a complex and technical tool that can 
easily be (mis)used by policy makers for political reasons to promise more than they can 
deliver, and to deliver more than they can afford. As a result, an expectations gap comes 
to exist which threatens the sincerity and authenticity of public decision making. 
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